Players arecooperators if they correctly declare their value added tax (VAT), and aredefectors otherwise . Each player’s payoff is influenced by the amount evaded and the subjective probability of being inspected by tax authorities . We analyzed several scenarios of audit probabilities for high and low transactions and their prevalence inthe population, as well as social rewards and penalties to find the mostefficient policy to increase the proportion of cooperators . Favorable social rewards for cooperators or alternativepenalties for defectors can be effective policies, but their success depends on the distribution of the audit probability for low and high transactions . We study the model with a well-mixed population and different scale-free networks . We found that increasing the subjective audit probability is more efficient than increasing this probability for hightransactions was more efficient . We also find that increasing tax rates for low transactions are more efficient to increase this

Author(s) : M. Chica, J. Hernandez, C. Manrique-de-Lara-PeƱate, R. Chiong

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Keywords : probability - audit - tax - transactions - increasing -

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