A key challenge in responding to public health crises such as COVID-19 is the difficulty of predicting the results of feedback interconnections between the disease and society . We study the game-theoretic equilibria that emerge from this setup when the population is composed of either selfish or altruistic individuals . This suggests that a population without central coordination may react poorly to a pandemic, and that individual altruism could even exacerbatethe problem . Our work is in sharp contrast to recent work in network congestion games in which all altruistic equities are sociallyoptimal, our work suggests that such an altruistic equilibrium may even be a problem for a population with central coordination, such as the pandemic. This is in contrast to the work innetwork congestion games, in which altruism is sociallyoptimistic equilibrian equilibra are socialoptimal. It suggests that all altruist equilibri

Author(s) : Philip N. Brown, Brandon Collins, Colton Hill, Gia Barboza, Lisa Hines

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Keywords : congestion - pandemic - suggests - altruistic - altruism -

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