We consider the problem of budget allocation for competitive influencemaximization over social networks . In this problem, multiple competing parties(players) want to distribute their limited advertising resources over a set of social individuals to maximize their long-run cumulative payoffs . We show that the optimal investment strategy for the case of a single-playercan be found in polynomial time by solving a concave program, and theopen-loop equilibrium strategies for the multiplayer dynamic game can becomputed efficiently by following natural regret minimization dynamics . Ourresults extend the earlier work on the static version of the problem to adynamic multistage game to include adynamic multi-age game, our results show that .

Author(s) : S. Rasoul Etesami

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Keywords : game - social - problem - show - loop -

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