This work focuses on the design of incentive mechanisms in congestion games . Our main result provides a characterization of this tradeoff interms of upper and lower bounds on the Pareto frontier between the price ofanarchy and price of stability . We demonstrate that the best equilibrium is not necessarily any better than the worst equilibrium for such a design choice . Our results also establish that, in several well-studied cases, the unincentivized setting doesnot even lie on the frontier, and that any incentive with price ofstability equal to 1 incurs a much higher price of anarchy . The best equilibrium in several cases doesn’t even lie in the unintended setting, according to our results . We conclude that the optimal incentive with a price ofstableness is not always any more than that of anarchy in a well- studied setting. In some cases,

Author(s) : Rahul Chandan, Dario Paccagnan, Jason R. Marden

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Keywords : price - equilibrium - cases - incentive - setting -

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