In this paper, we investigate the so-called ODP-problem that has been defined by Caragiannis and Micha [10] Here, we are in a setting with twoelection alternatives out of which one is assumed to be correct . In ODP, thegoal is to organise the delegations in the social network in order to maximiz the probability that the correct alternative, referred to as ground truth, is elected . We prove that, unless $P=NP, there isno polynomial-time algorithm for ODP that achieves an approximation guarantee of$\alpha \ge (\ln n)^{-C}$where$n\$ is the number of voters . The reduction designed for this result uses poorly connected social networks in which some of the voters suffer from misinformation . We run extensive simulations and observe that simple algorithms (working either in a centralized ordecentralized way) outperform direct democracy on a large class of instances. Lastly, we run simulations andobserve that they outperformed direct democracy .

Author(s) : Ruben Becker, Gianlorenzo D'Angelo, Esmaeil Delfaraz, Hugo Gilbert